Some folks keep writing that the Giants have gotten the breaks so far.
Breaks? Don’t break my heart!
For sure, just about every close or unusual play has come out in SF’s favor. But let’s review those plays:
Game 1:
- Two great sliding catches by Gregor Blanco in LF, each with a man aboard.
- Angel Pagan’s chopper squibbing off 3rd base for a double, starting a 3-run rally with two outs.
- Barry Zito driving in a run with a two-out hit.
Game 2:
- A three-act drama to nip Prince Fielder — Blanco’s recovery on the carom, Marco Scutaro’s great relay and Buster Posey’s swift tag.
- A leaping stab by Pablo Sandoval in Game 2, taking extra bases away from Miguel Cabrera with a man on 1st and no outs.
- Omar Infante getting picked off by Madison Bumgarner and almost beating the throw from Brandon Belt.
- Blanco’s bunt single in Game 2 that rolled dead down the 3rd base line, loading the bags with no outs in a scoreless game.
- Pagan just beating a perfect throw by Gerald Laird to swipe 2nd with one out in the 8th.
But when we talk about breaks, don’t we mean luck, bad calls and the like? Not one of these plays fits under that banner. Yes, Pagan got an extra base when the ball hit the bag — but that was already sure to be a single. And maybe the exact same bunt by Blanco would go foul two out of three times; but even if it had done, he’d still be at bat with a 3-and-2 count, 2 on and no outs. The umpires’ calls all held up on replay. Everything else about those plays is good old-fashioned execution by the Giants — including Pagan spoiling three 2-strike pitches before hitting that chopper (good things can’t happen if you don’t hit the ball), Zito making contact on a 2-2 pitch (see above), and Blanco, facing a bunt defense, laying one down so well that they had no play.
The Giants are playing great, winning baseball.
Meanwhile, here are Detroit’s biggest mistakes in Game 2:
Mistake #1: It’s beating a dead bison by now, but it was foolish of Gene Lamont to wave Prince Fielder around third with no outs. Not only does the situation call for caution in general; not only does Prince Fielder running look nothing like a gazelle; but Gregor Blanco had the ball and was into his throwing motion when Fielder was still at least three steps from 3rd base.
A point about run expectancy from David Schoenfield’s SweetSpot blog:
According to … Tom Tango’s run-scoring matrix, an average team would be expected to score about 2.05 runs with runners at second and third and no outs; with a runner on second and one out, the average run production is about 0.7 runs. That data is from 1993 through 2010, so the run-scoring environment is a little lower now, and of course you would have to adjust based on upcoming hitters and so forth. Still, Lamont’s decision was about a 1.3-run decision. Fair or not, he made the wrong one.
Another aspect of that matrix: The chance that at least one run will score from a 3rd-and-2nd, no-out situation is about 0.87. With a man on 2nd and one out, the chance is about 0.42, less than half. Even if we deduct for the specific hitters coming up, and don’t add on for the near certainty of SF playing the infield back in the top of the 2nd of a tie game, I figure at least a 0.75 chance of at least one run from the first situation, and maybe 0.35 from the second. So the upside of sending him is a gain of about 0.25 in the chance of scoring at least one run — but the downside is more like 0.40 if he’s thrown out.
I wonder how many third-base coaches know those numbers.
- Why was Lamont so close to 3rd base when he issued the go code? Why didn’t he set up further down the baseline, as most coaches do on that kind of play?
Mistake #3: LHP Drew Smyly walking LHB Brandon Belt, then falling behind 3-and-1 on LHB Gregor Blanco, who obviously wanted to bunt. When an opponent wants to give you an out, with their #8-9 hitters coming up, you have to be able to take it. The count mattered because, on 3-1, you’re a little less sure of a bunt attempt, so the corner men can’t charge as quickly. Watch the clip from the 0:18 mark to see Miguel Cabrera playing in, but not breaking in until the bunt goes down. Blanco did a great job on three counts: he didn’t square away until Smyly was well into his motion, delaying Cabrera’s break; he got an excellent jump out of the batter’s box as soon as he made contact; and of course he directed it to the perfect spot. In his regular-season career, Blanco has bunted 76 times, resulting in 33 hits and 14 sacrifices.
- Cabrera and Gerald Laird had no option save to hope it went foul. But the play gives a lesson about modern MLB infields: Advances in field drainage technology, implemented with the wave of new ballparks in the last 20 years, have created some fields that don’t slope away from the middle towards the sides, the way that most of us are used to. Rollers up the line are less likely to curve foul — especially bunts, which usually don’t have the sidespin that a full swing can impart.
Mistake #4: Smyly walking Angel Pagan to start the 8th, then not holding him close enough to prevent a one-out stolen base.
Mistake #5: Octavio Dotel walking Buster Posey on four pitches, loading the bases with one out (all on walks), then not being able to strike out Hunter Pence after an 0-and-2 start. During the regular season, Dotel:
- walked only 4 of 145 RHBs;
- walked just 2 of 57 first batters faced;
- issued just one walk that advanced another runner (man on 1st);
- held RHBs to a .197 batting average (3rd straight year under .200);
- held all batters to .197 with RISP and 3 for 23 with 2 or more runners on;
- held all batters to .168 with 2 strikes (45% strikeouts); and
- allowed 3 sac flies in 32 chances.
Sigh.
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In franchise history, the Giants have won the first two games of a World Series four times, and went on to win all four Series in dominant fashion — 2010 (4-1), 1954 (4-0), 1933 (4-1), 1922 (4-0). They did the same after their only 2-0 edge in any other postseason series, the 2002 LCS (4-1).
Detroit has lost the first two games of a WS just once before, in 1908, and they lost that Series, 4-1. They also lost the LCS in 1972 (3-2), ’87 (4-1) and 2011 (4-2) after dropping the first two contests.
Jim Leyland has been down 0-2 in the 1992 and 2011 LCS, without surviving either one.
The last time Detroit won it all, they won games 3-4-5 at home, after sweeping the ALCS.
Guess which one of those straws I’m clutching at?